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ESSAY: WHERE HAVE ALL THE SOLDIERS GONE II:
MILITARY VETERANS IN CONGRESS AND THE
STATE OF CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS
Donald N. Zillman°
I.
In a 1997 essay in these pages, I reported on the fact that a declining number of
senators and members of the House of Representatives were veterans of military
service.' At the height of the Vietnam War, roughly 70% of the members of Congress
were veterans.' By 1991, the Congress that approved the use of force against Iraq in
Operation Desert Storm had only slightly more veterans than non-veterans. 3 Three
Congresses later, the percentage of veterans had dropped to 32%.'
The explanation for the decline is almost certainly not that the American voter no
longer likes to elect veterans to serve in Congress. On balance, a period of honorable
military service is a plus on any candidate's resume. The primary reason for the
decline in congressional veterans is the change in the likelihood that a prospective
candidate for Congress would have seen military service. Legislators who came of age
during World War II were highly likely to have served in America's largest
mobilization for foreign war. Legislators who came of age during the early Cold War
(including the Korean Conflict) and faced the military draft during a period of shortage
of young men of draft age were quite likely to have served in the armed forces.
Congressmen who faced the draft during the Vietnam War era (birth dates 1939-1955),
however, were three times as likely not to have served in the armed forces as to have
served. Lastly, the growing numbers of Congressmen and women who reached
maturity after the end of the military draft (birth dates after 1956) were almost certain
not to have military experience.
Those were the numbers as of the elections of 1996. Given the changing
demographics of veterans in the general population, they were not surprising. The
numbers also offered the easy prediction that the number of veterans in Congress
would further decline as the World War II and Cold War generations left Congress to
be replaced by members who came of age during the Volunteer Era.
The article further asked why we should care.5 Should we be concerned that
Congress is over- or under- represented by lawyers, union members, business owners,
or social workers? I argued that military veterans bring unique assets to the Congress
including a familiarity with high or ground level military policy, a prior exposure to
national service, an appreciation of the distinctive characteristics of military service,
* Edward Godfrey Professor of Law, University of Maine School of Law. United States Army 1970-
1974. My thanks for the insightful comments of Charles Moskos, Eugene Fidell, Michael Noone, and
William Eckhardt.
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and the moral authority of having "been there themselves" when sending young men
and women into combat for national objectives. Former Senator Warren Rudman
captured a number of the points eloquently in his book Combat, Twelve Years in the
U.S. Senate:
I saw an unexpected theme emerge: the importance of my Korean War experience
in my life and the bond I felt with other senators, such as Bob Dole, Dan Inouye and
Bob Kerrey, who had also known combat. If you have that experience, not much is
left in life that will intimidate you .... If as a young man, you have seen your
friends die for their country, you are left with a sense of what is important in life and
what is not.'
The discussion of the declining number of congressional veterans has implications
for the structure of our armed forces and for the relations between the military and
civilian society in 21st century America. The drafters of the Constitution were richly
experienced in the values of and the threats from the military. They crafted a
document that paid serious attention to the structure of the military in American
society. Two hundred and fifteen years of legislation, judicial decisions, and practice
in the field has modified and refined the basic legal structure of the armed forces in
America and the relationship of the civilian and military communities.
This essay will first update the figures for legislators with military experience
through the 2004 election. Prior trends continue. Military veterans now compose only
25% of Congress. Young senators and congresspersons are highly unlikely to have
military experience. The Republican party has become disproportionately the party
of veterans in Congress.
The amount of military experience in Congress provides a framework from which
to examine aspects of civilian-military relations in 2006. I want to discuss three
questions and offer some tentative answers. First, have the workings of the all-
volunteer military exempted many of the privileged in society (and Congress is
certainly a bastion of privilege) from any responsibility for military service and any
connection with the military? Second, do these and other factors suggest the need to
return to military conscription-the draft? Third, has a precept of healthy military-
civilian relations-the politically neutral or "above politics" status of the
military-been altered? The 1997 Essay closed with a plea for greater connectedness
between all sectors of the American people and its armed forces.7 That need is even
greater in 2006.
My goal is not to draw precise causal connections between the number of veteran
members of Congress and military policies or the connections of civilian society to the
military. Fifty more or fifty fewer legislators with military service might not change
congressional votes or congressional attitudes. What the steady decline in members
of Congress with military service does reflect is a unique confluence in American
history. We have had periods when serious military challenges faced the country and
the military and civilian society (including civilian elites) joined in the common effort.
The Revolution, the Civil War, World War I, and World War II and the Cold War are
the examples. We have also had periods of our history when the military was
6. WARREN RuDMAN, COMBAT, TWELVE YEARS iN THE U.S. SENATE 274 (1996).
7. Zillman, supra note 1, at 110.
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insignificant in size and mission and when its concerns were remote from most of
civilian society. The early days of the Republic, the pre-Civil War period, the Gilded
Age of the late 19th century, and the 1920s and '30s are examples. What we now have
is an era in which military matters are highly important to America and in which a
significant portion of the American population (and a large portion of some of its
elites) are largely disconnected from the military.8
II.
How profoundly things have changed since the 1997 article appeared. In 1997,
the United States was adjusting to victory in the Cold War. The Soviet Union was no
more. Eastern Europe was evolving in the direction of the Western democracies. The
1990-91 operation in Iraq and Kuwait proved that America could gather a coalition of
allies to defeat any military threats from the rest of the world. The change from forty
years of Cold War and nuclear standoff was so great that in 1992, a relatively obscure
Democrat who had dodged the draft during Vietnam could unseat a war hero president
who had just guided the Desert Storm victory. The immediate future did appear to be
about "the economy, stupid" with military concerns playing a secondary role.
A great deal has happened since 1997: September 11, Operation Enduring Free-
dom, Operation Iraqi Freedom, the Axis of Evil. The names suggest a world in which
the military is again highly relevant. So too, our politics have been sharply divided.
Two bitterly contested presidential elections followed a sharply partisan impeachment
effort. Politics in the Congress is remarkably bitter.
We return to the issue of military experience in Congress.9 The four Congresses
elected since 1996 have shown a steady decline in the number of military veterans who
are members. The 176 veterans in the 106th Congress have been reduced to 164
veterans in the 107th Congress, to 147 veterans in the 108th Congress, and 133
veterans in the 109th Congress, elected in November 2004. Only one in four
legislators now brings to Congress any military experience."
Of the twenty-three veterans who left Congress after the 2002 election, virtually
all chose not to run again for their seat. The prominent exception was Senator, and
Democratic Minority Leader, Tom Daschle, who was defeated for re-election by a non-
veteran. Of the departing veterans, thirteen were Republicans and ten Democrats.
Nine veterans were among the new members of Congress. Eight were Republicans.
Representative John Salazar of Colorado was the only Democrat.
The numbers continue to reflect the changing of generations in Congress. Only
nine senators and representatives with military experience are members of the World
War II generation, but most of the legislators of that age are veterans. At the other
8. For a superb study of the divide between the military and the civilian elites, see generally KATHY
ROTH-DOUQUET & FRANK SCHAEFFER, AWOL: THE UNEXCUSED ABSENCE OF AMERICA'S UPPER CLASSES
FROM MImARY SERVICES - AND How IT HURTS OUR COUNTRY (2006).
9. Virtually all information is drawn from the congressional staff directory biographies of senators and
representatives. In a few instances, information comes from legislators' web sites. In both places military
service is self-reported by the legislator.
10. The Veterans Administration reports that the 2000 Census identified 26,403,703 civilian veterans.
They formed 13% of the civilian population over eighteen years of age. Center for Minority Veterans 2000
Census, http://www.va.gov/centerforminorityveteranslpage.cfmpg=5 (last visited Oct. 3, 2005).
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end, 110 members of Congress were born after 1955 and never faced the military draft.
Of their number, only seven are veterans.
The 1997 article observed that:
More veterans were Republicans than Democrats. However, the numbers do not
appear out of proportion with GOP majorities in both houses of Congress .... [T]he
matter bears watching in future Congresses. The disappearance of a veteran presence
in Congress is troubling .... It would be even more troubling if that limited presence
represents one political party disproportionately."
Today, disproportion has arrived. In the 109th Congress, the thirty-one veteran
senators are thirteen Democrats, seventeen Republicans, and Independent Jim Jeffords
of Vermont. The House veterans are sixty-five Republicans and thirty-six Democrats.
The disproportion by political party is even greater when date of election and age are
considered. Of the veterans first elected to Congress in 2000 or later, twenty-one are
Republicans and eight are Democrats, one of whom, Senator Frank Lautenburg of New
Jersey, returned to his former seat. Of the fourteen veterans, most of whose service
took place in the All-Volunteer Force Era, twelve are Republicans and two Democrats.
That includes Republican Representative Heather Wilson of New Mexico who has the
distinction of being the only female member of Congress of any age or party with
military service. Of those seven legislators born in 1956 or later with military service,
all are Republicans.
III.
The continuing decline of military experience among members of Congress and
the heavily Republican leanings of the veteran legislators who remain raise questions
about the relationship of America to its armed forces. American military policy has
been shaped by the Constitution, federal statutes, executive orders and decisions, and
popular assumptions about what the American people expect of the military and what
the military needs from the American people.
The drafters of the Constitution had ample experience with the military. No other
21st century mission of the federal establishment-provision of social services,
preservation and use of the national lands, governance of the economy-received the
attention that the military did in the text of the Constitution and the first ten amend-
ments. Those provisions have stood unamended for over two centuries.
Two themes appear in the seventeen Constitutional clauses that relate directly to
the military. The first is a suspicion of uncontrolled military force. The grant to
Congress of the powers to "raise and support armies"' 2 and to "provide and maintain
a navy '' 3 presumed the creation of some federal military establishment. That military
establishment was placed under the control of the two major elected units of the new
national government: Congress and the president. The fear of the permanent standing
army-a far greater threat to the citizen than the permanent navy-was addressed by
11. Zillknan, supra note 1, at 91.
12. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 12.
13. Id. atcl. 13.
[Vol. 58:1
MILITARY VETERANS IN CONGRESS
the requirement that Army appropriations be for no longer than two years. This
required each new Congress to rethink and refund Army policies.
Civilian control over the military was divided between the Congress and the
executive. The single Article II executive power-the president shall be "commander
in chief"'4 of the national military establishment-was balanced by Congressional
powers to fund the forces, to make "rules for [their] Government and Regulation,"' 5
to provide for calling forth the militia and for shaping their structure. Congress, not
the president, was given the power to "declare war."' 6 All of these provisions reduced
the prospect of a single civilian commander conspiring with the uniformed military to
tyrannize the American people.
Fears of the standing national military were also mitigated by the militia
provisions. The Constitution recognized a significant military power in the state
militias, the predecessors of the National Guards. The militia could augment the
federal forces, but they also served to continue the close ties of colonial days between
the armed forces and the civilian populations. The regulars might be career officers
and long-term enlistees whose primary home and loyalty was the army. The militia
members were the descendants of the Minutemen, you and your next-door neighbor.
Similar fears of the national military were reflected in two of the provisions of the
Bill of Rights. Whatever else it meant, the Second Amendment's praise of a "well-
regulated militia, being necessary to the security of a free state" and its recognition of
the "right of the people to keep and bear arms" indicated that one purpose of the militia
was to serve as a check on a too-powerful national military establishment. 17 The Third
Amendment-that deadest letter of the Bill of Rights-forbade the forced housing of
soldiers in civilian homes in peacetime.
As important as the fear of uncontrolled military power was, a second theme of
the Constitution was a desired connectedness of the armed forces with the citizenry.
The recognitions of the militia in the Constitution and its endorsement in the Second
Amendment spoke to a world in which the average male citizen would take part in
some military activities and would possess one of the most fundamental military skills.
The congressional powers over force size, funding, governance, and use also put the
average citizen close to elected leaders who were regularly involved in setting military
policy. The recognition of the president as commander-in-chief held open the possi-
bility that much of the military leadership could come directly from the citizenry.
Lastly, while not specified in the Constitution, the new government and the American
people soon adopted the precept that Americans would conduct America's military
business. To a nation that had won its independence with considerable European
military assistance and had watched the British fight with hired German mercenaries,
such a proposition was not self-evident.
While the Constitution has remained unchanged in its assignments of military
power and control from 1791 to 2006, many of the assumptions of the 18th century
have changed drastically. Other matters that were left open in 1791 have now resolved
themselves. Federal statutes, executive decisions, and changes in citizen attitudes have
14. Id. at art. IL § 2, cl. 13.
15. Id. at art. I, § 8, cl. 14.
16. Id. at cl. 11.
17. Ua at amend. 11.
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shaped a very different military establishment from that envisioned at the
Constitutional Convention. Some changes have evolved over the full two centuries.
Other changes have taken place just in the remarkable sixty-five years since American
entry into World War II.
Over the passage of two centuries, the professional military has gained pre-
eminence. For many years, there has been nothing discretionary in the grants of power
to Congress to create armies and navies. A proposal to abolish either would probably
end the career of most legislators. The creation of the service academies recognized
military leadership as a skilled profession. Americans understand that a part of the
American military establishment will be a cadre of senior officers and non-
commissioned officers (NCOs) whose lifetime business is the measured use of force.
The growth of the national, permanent military establishment has doomed the
militia, or National Guard, to a subordinate role. Federal dollars determine how the
National Guards will be equipped, trained, and used. The president trumps the
governor.' 8 The prospect of the militia serving as the check on a too-powerful national
military force has long since disappeared. The point is captured in the possibly
apocryphal story of die-hard Louisiana segregationist, Leander Perez, discussing plans
in the 1950s to resist federal racial integration orders by the use of local military force.
One of his U.S. senators from Louisiana put an end to such fancies with a blunt: "No,
no, Leander. You don't understand. The feds have got the atomic bomb."
Over two hundred years, presidential power over military matters has grown at the
expense of the Congress. Curiously, presidents have not asserted fully their express
Constitutional designation as "commander-in-chief' to exercise field command over
the troops. Presidents have, however, boldly construed the "commander-in-chief"
power to direct major aspects of the operation of the armed forces. Two centuries have
shown the reality that in times of crisis, America rallies around one leader, rather than
the Congress. The Lincoln, Wilson, Roosevelt, or Bush who acts boldly can usually
bring the country, and the Congress, along with him.
Modern American military history starts with the immense activity of America's
two-year involvement in World War I. The actions of President Woodrow Wilson and
the 65th Congress-enormous military build-up, conscription, mobilization of the
civilian economy for war, and close involvement in international affairs-provided
precedents when America entered an even greater world war. America has never
looked back from World War II. Several of the premises of that era about the
American military have remained unchanged to today. Others, particularly ones
involving the connectedness of the average citizen to the military, have changed.
The three decades from 1940, and the introduction of America's first peace-time
military draft one year before Pearl Harbor,' 9 to the early 1970s, and the termination
of America's failed involvement in Southeast Asia, set a standard for America's
understanding of the relationship of the military and civilian society. For the entire
period, it was expected that world affairs might call for the use of American military
force. Whether the enemy was Germany, Japan, the Soviet Union, or Communist
China, America knew that it faced formidable adversaries. It also knew that large
18. See Perpich v. Dep't of Def., 496 U.S. 334 (1990).
19. Act of Sept. 16, 1940, ch. 720, 54 Stat. 885.
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portions of the rest of the world depended on American military strength. Any serious
prospect of continued American isolation vanished in the face of long-range bombers,
intercontinental ballistic missiles, nuclear weapons, and an increasingly interconnected
world economy. America became a world military power.
American presidents, Congresses, and a solid majority of the public assented to
the proposition that America would supply all the military force that was needed to do
the job. The military budget took a favored position in congressional debates. For a
wide variety of other government expenditures, the question was "how much can we
afford?" For the military, the question was how much do we need for supremacy in
nuclear weapons, for a conventional army sufficient to repel a Soviet invasion through
Germany, or to defeat fascist or communist aggression in the Pacific, North Africa,
Europe, or East Asia.
The military establishment that was created to serve those objectives was closely
connected to most Americans. Selective Service and voluntary enlistments brought
sixteen million young Americans into the armed forces during World War II. Their
spouses, children, and parents picked up the responsibilities of parenting and filling out
an understaffed civilian work force. Few populated parts of the United States were not
closely proximate to a military installation or industrial plant working for the war
effort. For much of the period, war-hot or cold-was the preeminent story.
Heavy manpower demands, the draft, and popular sentiment made the World War
II effort one that included all social classes. President Roosevelt's sons served in
uniform. Some members of Congress, including future President Lyndon Johnson,
determined they should serve in uniform rather than remain in their congressional
seats. Professional baseball, the prominent sport of the time, saw much of its talent in
the armed services. Prominent entertainment figures of both sexes and all ages either
joined the forces for serious wartime service or offered their talents for morale building
to aid the war effort. The draft of the early Cold War years continued to touch the
lives of most healthy young males.2"
All of this gave the military a close connectedness to the life of the average
American. Some military veterans became lifetime champions of all things military.
Others took a more cautious view of military virtues. A few veterans despised their
service. But, it was probably accurate to say that during the 1950s and 1960s, the
considerable majority of the American adult population of all social classes could say
they had served in the armed forces, knew people who had or were doing so, or had
connection with the military in the life of their home community.
A final aspect of civilian-military relations from 1940-1970 was the military's
relative freedom from partisan politics. World War I had firmly placed uniformed
leadership of the military in the hands of service academy and other career
professionals. The model of non-partisan military leadership in World War II was
Chief of Staff General George Marshall who took quiet pride in not becoming a
Franklin Roosevelt intimate and refused even to vote lest it call into question his
readiness to serve whomever the American people elected as commander-in-chief.
20. The early Cold War draft reached America's elites. The eminent military sociologist Charles
Moskos reports: "In my Princeton class of 1956, out of 750 males, well over 400 served. In the class of
2005-1,100 male and female--only 8 served." Letter from Charles Moskos, to Donald Zillman (Sept. 5,
2005) (on file with the author).
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When General Dwight Eisenhower first emerged as a presidential prospect, both
political parties believed he could be enlisted in their cause. That direction from the
top permeated the ranks of career officers and senior enlisted men. Good soldiers
stayed quiet about their politics, avoided political activities, and scorned the rare senior
officers who appeared to be playing politics for career advantage. On the civilian side,
bipartisan consensus governed much military policy. Both major parties were seen as
solidly pro-military. Civilian leaders respected the professional military's need to stay
out of partisan politics.
This aspect of military-civilian relations began to change with the Vietnam War.
In the long run, the Vietnam War will likely be seen as a minor setback in fifty years
of successful, and by no means certain, American diplomatic and military policy. How
did the world look from an American perspective in 1941? Germany and Japan
appeared to be the military powers of the era. Both nations were ready to use their
armed forces to expand their control over resources and population. Soviet Russia was
either aligned with the fascist nations against the Western democracies or posed a
separate threat to Western values. A United States, still struggling to recover from
economic chaos and without major military forces, hardly seemed a superpower ready
to shape the world in its image.
Who, but the most cockeyed optimist in 1941 would have predicted the world of
1991? By then, fascist militarism in Germany, Italy, and Japan had been exterminated.
All three countries had become leaders in the Western democratic alliance with
commitments to market economies, multi-party democracies, human rights, and
opposition to the aggressive use of force throughout the world. The Soviet Union had
imploded. 1950s-style communism had vanished in all but a handful of backwaters.
Many of the former Soviet colonies had moved to Western-style democracy. Russia
itself was struggling in that direction with a massively reduced military capability.
Communist China retained a non-democratic government, but had shifted to a market
economy and increased connections with the Western democracies. In 1991, the
United States stood alone as the military superpower able to use its force to advance
a variety of national and international ends. No other nation could have undone Iraq's
economically and politically momentous seizure of Kuwait.
The state of the world, however, looked far different in the 1970s. Then, Vietnam
was seen as a serious defeat for America. Portions of the American population blamed
both civilian and military leadership. The military, particularly the army, was forced
to a hard rethinking of its future. An anti-military philosophy became popular with
portions of the American people.
The draft was one casualty of the times. Previous assumptions that the United
States would fight everywhere to maintain amorphous concepts of liberty and freedom
faced newer doubts whether the United States should fight anywhere. In the half
dozen years following American withdrawal from Vietnam, America refused to contest
the final communist takeover of Southeast Asia, avoided challenging Soviet
adventurism in Africa, Central America, and Afghanistan, endured the economic and
political use of Middle Eastern petroleum against its interests, and suffered the
humiliation of a seizure of its embassy in Iran and a failed military effort to recover the
embassy hostages.
Military rebuilding began in the Carter Administration. However, the election of
1980 put military policy clearly on the national ballot. The American people opted
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decisively for Ronald Reagan's promise to rebuild America's forces and confront
America's enemies. The new administration did so with heavy investment in hardware
and personnel. It verbally challenged Soviet expansionism but was careful about the
actual use of force in open-ended commitments. Secretary of Defense Casper
Weinberger's precepts on the use of military force--only for clearly defined objectives
solidly supported by the Congress and the American people done with overwhelming
force and with a clear exit strategy--combined restored military power with a promise
of "no more Vietnams."
Historians will debate forever whether brilliance or luck should describe the
Reagan policies. Whichever it was, America was left as the single military superpower
by 1991, a claim that could not have been made at the end of World War II. Another
decade made clear that some of the fundamental assumptions that governed American
civil-military relations from World War II to Vietnam had changed and were changing.
An underlying theme is the disconnectedness of the American electorate with the
military. A Congress that increasingly lacks personal military experience mirrors the
larger civilian society.
IV.
One connection between the citizenry and the military can come in the men and
women in uniform who exercise command of the forces. As noted, the Constitution
does not mandate a professional military establishment to lead the army and navy.
Even the commander-in-chief power suggests that the civilian president might take
field command. Congress, however, created the military academies at West Point and
Annapolis in the first half of the 19th century. Those actions anticipated that senior
leadership of the military and naval forces could come from the ranks of academy
graduates. But the triumph of the professionals was not immediate. The "political
general" remained a significant part of the military establishment through the Civil
War. Despite the pejorative connotation of "political generals" today, skilled soldiers
emerged from the political ranks. My state of Maine reveres Bowdoin College
professor turned regimental commander Joshua Lawrence Chamberlain who earned
the Congressional Medal of Honor at Gettysburg. And, such men knew their soldiers
and their civilian communities. They were governors, legislators, mayors, and in-
fluential citizens whose success outside the military depended on their ability to lead
and to reflect the needs of their fellow citizens. These men could also return to civilian
leadership after their military service with a strong understanding of the military.
Andrew Jackson and William Henry Harrison rode a combination of civilian and
military accomplishments to the presidency in the first half of the 19th century.
Almost all post-Civil War presidents served as Union officers in that conflict.
That eminent American Teddy Roosevelt became the classic political commander
as organizer and second-in-command of the Rough Riders in the Spanish-American
War in 1898. Two decades later, and after his presidency, Roosevelt became the
rallying point for a continuation of the political general in the World War I
mobilization. Roosevelt offered to raise one or more divisions of volunteers, whom
he would command, to be the first American troops sent to France. Congress delayed
passage of the draft bill to seriously vet the Roosevelt volunteer proposal. Congress
2006]
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stopped just short of ordering President Wilson, Secretary of War Newton Baker, and
the professional army command to accept the Roosevelt offer.2"
The rejection of Roosevelt's service marked the end of the military amateur in
command of the forces. Today, one could imagine the political firestorm if a president
announced that he was appointing his campaign manager or a recently defeated
senatorial candidate of his party to lead the 82nd Airborne Division. The citizenry of
today may be quite content, if not encouraging, of a health and human services
secretary who has never seen the inside of a hospital or a social welfare agency, a
secretary of agriculture who has never farmed, or an ambassador who needs to be
reminded of the capital city of his new post. They do expect the uniformed leader of
military forces to have come up through the ranks of professional soldiers and sailors.22
As a consequence, however, the general or admiral and the legislator who meet on
Capitol Hill come from very different worlds.
V.
A greater civilianizing of the armed forces will not come at the uniformed top
ranks. That leaves changing the composition of the forces at the lower ranks. The
most certain method of increasing the numbers of the armed forces and broadening
their representation of American society would be a return to involuntarily inducting
young men (and possibly young women) through the draft. Immediate political
wisdom is that this is a non-starter. The draft can be resumed only with congressional
approval. Both civilian and military leaders oppose the return to conscription. The
Selective Service System, the civilian agency that would handle the mechanics of a
reinstated draft, emphatically denies any plans to return to conscription.23 In a
bipartisan effort, taken primarily for political cover, the Congress overwhelmingly
rejected a return to conscription shortly before the 2004 election. 4 Parents and others
leading the campaign against military recruiters seeking volunteers in the schools
21. Act of May 18, 1917, ch. 15, 40 Stat. 76, 77-83.
22. The contemporary illustration may be the hapless Michael Brown's tenure as the head of the Federal
Emergency Management Agency at the time of the Hurricane Katrina disaster. This classic political
appointee lacked any emergency management experience, and it showed in time of crisis.
23. In its 2004 Annual Report to Congress, the Selective Service System reports:
On October 5, 2004, the House of Representatives voted 402-2 to defeat H.R. 163,
introduced on January 7, 2003, by Representative Charles Rangel, D-NY. The bill proposed
that all young persons in the United States, including women, aged 18 through 25, perform
two years of military or civilian service in furtherance of national defense, homeland
security, or community service.
Senator Ernest F. Hollings, D-SC, offered a parallel bill, S. 89. As of the end of FY
2004, the Senate Committee on Armed Services had not acted upon this bill, which died
officially with the end of the 108th Congress.
SELECTIVE SERVICE SYsTEM, FISCAL YEAR 2004 ANNUAL REPORT TO THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED
STATES 12 (2004), available at http://www.sss.gov/PDFs/SSS-AnnualReportFY04.pdf.
24. Id.
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would be apoplectic about a return to conscripted military service.25 Nonetheless, anti-
draft sentiment has changed before in American history.
The modern memory of the draft stems from the final few years of the Vietnam
Conflict. The received wisdom is that a draftee army all but refused to fight in
Vietnam, engaged in massive drug use, and killed its commanders. As a consequence,
Presidents Nixon and Ford were forced to abandon Southeast Asia and to end the draft,
replacing it with the all-volunteer armed forces. President Nixon's political judgment
was accurate in the short-term. Removing the threat of involuntary military service
slowed the anti-war movement and bought time for Nixon's bold strategy of building
openings to China and using those openings to deal with the Soviet Union.
The end of the draft was supported by both the political and the military
establishment. A new generation of military leaders, exemplified by Colin Powell, had
already started to rebuild morale and capability from the damage of Vietnam. They
had no desire to repeat the political struggles of the last years of the draft. They
promised that if the civilian leadership would provide ample dollars for hardware and
for improved salaries and benefits, clear direction as to mission, and popular support,
the military could return to pre-eminence. The Reagan and first Bush administrations
and the Congresses obliged and the 1991 Desert Storm campaign vindicated the all-
volunteer force. America, it seemed, did not need the draft to provide all the military
force it needed.
Two factors distinguished the Vietnam force from that of Desert Storm and helped
explain the Desert Storm success. First, following Vietnam, the military committed
to the full and coordinated use of active, reserve, and National Guard components.
One of the ironies of the Vietnam experience was that the trained reserve and National
Guard forces were not called to service in Vietnam. The reluctant 19-year-old draftee
faced a far greater chance of dying in the Vietnam jungles than the 20-year veteran of
a reserve or guard unit or the recent draft-evading recruit to that Guard or reserve unit.
The "total force" policy made clear that in the next war, the reserves and Guard
would serve with the active forces. 26 The Guard and Reserve forces received
25. See Damien Cave & Laura Cummins, Growing Problem for Military Recruiters: Parents, N.Y.
TIMEs, June 3, 2005, at Al; Bob Herbert, Op-Ed., They Won't Go, N.Y. TIMEs, June 13, 2005, at A17; Bob
Herbert, Uncle Sam Really Wants You, N.Y. TIMEs, June 16, 2005, at A27.
26. The National Guard's website describes the thinking:
Following the experience of fighting an unpopular war in Vietnam, the 1973 Total Force
Policy was designed to involve a large portion of the American public by mobilizing the
National Guard from its thousands of locations throughout the United States when needed.
The Total Force Policy required that all active and reserve military organizations of the
United States be treated as a single integrated force. A related benefit of this approach is to
permit elected officials to have a better sense of public support or opposition to any major
military operation. This policy echoes the original intentions of the founding fathers for a
small standing army complemented by citizen-soldiers.
Army National Guard, http://www.amg.army.millhistory/Constitutionldefault.asp?ID=7 (last visited January
10, 2006). The website also identifies the substantial Guard contribution to national defense. Half of the
Army's combat engineers are in the National Guard and 44% of all Army combat divisions are Guard
divisions. As of October 15, 2005, of the 1,970 military deaths in Operation Iraqi Freedom, 189 are
members of a reserve component and 305 are National Guard personnel. See Department of Defense
Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, Operation Iraqi Military Deaths,
http://www.dior.whs.millmmidlcasualty/oif-deaths-total.pdf (last visited January 10, 2006).
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equipment and training that would make them fully prepared for front-line combat
service. The total force was structured in such a way that mobilization for war could
not take place without the call-up of significant numbers of reserve and Guard units.
Such a force fought Desert Storm; the next-door neighbors called to active service
became both the heroes and casualties of war, where previously only the career officer,
NCO, or the first-tour young regular force recruit had been.
The second factor was the emergence of women as a part of the force. At the end
of American involvement in Vietnam in 1973, 2.5% of the active duty military was
female.27 By Desert Storm, 11 percent of the entire uniformed military were female.28
Between the two wars, substantial numbers of military occupational specialties were
opened to women. The ability to include significant numbers of women in the monthly
recruitment quotas for the volunteer force certainly eased the transition from the
draft. 29
After Desert Storm, the military continued to downsize. This served budgetary
objectives. It also eased concerns about getting sufficient volunteers. The Clinton
Administration was characterized by a reluctance to use military force; it delayed
intervention in the Balkans, withdrew from Somalia after casualties in Mogadishu,
ignored genocide in Rwanda, and failed to pursue military options against the early
evidences of Islamic terrorism. General Colin Powell, an advocate of the Weinberger
"use of force" standard, led or endorsed the Clinton policy. A revealing episode of the
era was when Secretary of State Madeleine Albright challenged General Powell by
asking what the point was of having the finest armed forces in the world if they were
not going to be used. Those days seem far distant in 2006.
A serious assessment of the military draft must go beyond the last years of
Vietnam and the thirty years of success with the all-volunteer force. The worst
experiences with the draft came in its first and (to date) last uses-the Civil War and
Vietnam. The Civil War was fought primarily with volunteers. The Union experience
with conscription provided less than 10% of the total armed forces raised.30 The 1863
Draft Law allowed individuals to avoid drafted service by buying substitutes for
$300.a" This blatant class bias helped inspire draft riots in New York City in the same
week that the Battle of Gettysburg was helping to decide the outcome of the War.
27. See Department of Defense Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, Selected Manpower
Statistics, http'/www.dior.whs.mil/mmid/mOl/fy96/smstop.htm (last visited Oct. 31, 2005) (in particular,
see Tables 2-11 and 2-17A for the pertinent raw data).
28. Id.
29. A third change in military force structure was a movement to hire contracted civilians in the place
of those positions previously held by the military. For example, in Iraq:
[M]ore than 60 firms currently employ more than 20,000 private personnel... to carry out
military functions ... roughly the same number as are provided by all of the United States'
coalition partners combined. President George W. Bush's "coalition of the willing" might
thus be more aptly described as the "coalition of the billing."
P.W. Singer, Outsourcing War, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Mar.-Apr. 2005, at 119, 122.
30. JOHN W. CHAMBERS, IL To RAISE AN ARMY: THE DRAFt CoMEs TO MODERN AMERICA 42 (1987)
(during the Civil War, "the U.S. Volunteers composed more than 92 percent of the 2,100,000 men... who
served in the Union Army").
31. Act of Mar. 3. 1863. ch. 75. 12 Stat. 731.
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Memories of the Civil War draft were still strong a half-century later, as the
United States prepared to enter World War I. Nonetheless, the strong preference of the
uniformed military leadership, and eventually of President Woodrow Wilson and of
the Congress, was to use conscription to form the army that would fight Germany.
What prompted America to turn its back on a history of raising armies by volunteers?
One factor was the accurate perception that this war would mobilize the entire
American people. America would have to be both the arsenal and the granary of
democracy. Production of weapons, ships, and food would be needed for European
allies as well as the American forces and the citizenry. A second factor prompting
conscription was the presence of reports from British military experts on the disastrous
British experience of allowing eager first volunteers to be sent immediately to the front
lines where they were slaughtered. Many of these victims would have better served
the national interest as the training cadres for later groups of recruits and draftees. In
America, the perception of many members of Congress was the exact opposite of what
it would be in 2005. In 1917, legislators felt that the "best and brightest" young
Americans would volunteer and be killed first, while the lower class "slackers"
avoided service. 32 A third factor supporting conscription was that selective service
appealed to the public policy makers of the Wilson Administration. Mobilization
demanded unemotional, scientific examination of who served the country best in what
position, rather than a patriotic rush to the colors.33
The Draft Act of 1917 achieved its objectives.34 Nine and one half million young
men registered for possible service on June 5, 1917. Their credentials were assessed
by civilian draft board members who chose over two million of their young neighbors
to enter the armed forces.35 That national mobilization helped encourage other
volunteers from all social classes. By war's end, American fatalities included a son
of former President Roosevelt (two others were seriously wounded), the former mayor
of New York City, a leading member of the House Military Affairs Committee, and
numerous children of privilege.
The conscript army arrived in France just in time to help roll back the final
German advance in June and July of 1918 and to compel the Germans to ask for an
armistice in November. Historians will continue to debate whether the American force
in 1918 deserved major credit for winning the war or merely arrived at the time of
eventual French and British success. What is undeniable is the assessment of an
anonymous Frenchman at the welcome for American General Pershing in Paris in
1917: "Behind him there are ten million more!" Those ten million would have come
from the military draft.
32. See 55 Cong. Rec. 971, 976, 980 (1917) (remarks of Reps. Lunn, Crago, and Olney).
33. A Proclamation by the President of the United States, N.Y. TIMES, May 19, 1917, at 1. In the
proclamation, President Wilson noted:
The whole nation must be a team, in which each man shall play the part for which he is best
fitted. To this end, Congress has provided that the nation shall be organized for war by
selection; that each man shall be classified for service in the place to which it shall best serve
the general good to call him.
Id. (noting that, "[t]he business now at hand is undramatic, practical, and of scientific directness and
precision").




Twenty years later, America mobilized again. The World War I experience with
the draft served as the model for an even greater conscription. The expectation was
that every physically able young male would serve. Many, persuaded by the First
World War experience that Uncle Sam was quite serious about conscription,
volunteered for the armed force or assignment of choice, rather than waiting for the
unavoidable draft call. Again, as in World War I, the perception was that all
served-presidents' sons, star athletes, Ivy League graduates, and movie stars. After
the fact, the symbol of upper class sacrifice was millionaire and former Ambassador
to Great Britain, Joseph Kennedy. Despite Kennedy's considerable reluctance to fight
Nazi Germany, he lost one son to a high-risk aerial mission in Europe and had another
seriously wounded in Naval combat in the South Pacific.
The conscript-shaped army of World War II also provided a remarkable quality
of young Americans for missions that needed exactly that kind of initiative. The late
historian Stephen Ambrose's exhaustive study of the D-Day veterans made the point
that the success of the Normandy landings was less a matter of superb generalship than
superb, and often uncoordinated, leadership by junior officers and NCOs. Speaking
more broadly of the quality of the first American troops in Europe in the summer of
1944, Ambrose noted: "Rich kids. Bright kids. The quarterback on the championship
high-school football team. The president of his class. The chess champion. The lead
in the class play. The solo in the spring concert. The wizard in the chemistry class.
America was throwing its finest young men at the Germans."36 A large number of
those "very best" were conscripts, or draft inspired volunteers. The common
experience for the healthy, young male regardless of race, class, or occupation in 1944
was to be a uniformed member of the armed services.
For a brief period after the war, the draft ended as America demobilized. By the
late 1940s, however, the Cold War was in full swing and the draft was reinstated. For
most of the next fifteen years, including the hard fighting of the Korean War, military
service remained a common feature of the experience of young American men. Such
disparate Americans as Ted Kennedy and Elvis Presley served an honorable term of
enlisted service. Ted Williams was recalled to active duty from his position as one of
the most visible professional athletes of his generation. To an America whose
memories of the massive mobilization of World War II were still fresh, this seemed
normal.37
In the mid-1960s, things changed. The coming of age of the huge Baby Boom
cohort of young males and the growing unpopularity of the Vietnam War doomed the
draft. The large numbers of draft-eligible young men provided more manpower than
the armed forces needed. A Selective Service System pamphlet of the era captured the
dilemma: "Who Serves, When Not All Serve?" 38
36. STEPHEN E. AMBROSE, THE VicToRs, EIsENHowER AND His Boys: THE MEN OF WORLD WAR I1
262(1998). See generally STEPHEN E. AMBROSE, D-DAY, JUNE 6, 1944: THECLIMAcTICBATTLEOF WORLD
WAR 1 (1994); STEPHEN E. AMBROSE, CITIZEN SOLDIERS (1998).
37. PETER F. RAMSBURGER AND D. BRUCE BELL, WHAT WE KNow ABOuT AWOL AND DESERTION,
(U.S. Army Research Institute ed., 2002), available at http://www.hqda.army.mil/ari/pdf/s51.pdf (reporting
that draftees had lower AWOL and desertion rates than volunteers in World War 11, Korea, and Vietnam).
38. See generally BURKE MARSHALL, IN PURSUIT OF EQUITy: WHO SERVES WHEN NOT ALL SERVE?
(1987).
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Reliance on the draft to staff the Vietnam force was made worse by the practical
answer to the question: Who serves when not all serve? The answer was the poor, the
undereducated, and the unprivileged. Congress, the leaders of Selective Service, and
hundreds of individual draft board members joined to exempt many children of the
privileged classes from service. Educational or occupational deferments favored those
in college and numerous white-collar occupations. The extensive physical and mental
fitness standards served to help the privileged. A careful physical review of the
prospective draftee could reveal trick knees, ulcers, or psychiatric conditions that
precluded military service. The child of the privileged class typically had an extensive
medical record and a supportive family doctor or psychiatrist to document such a
claim. The less fortunate did not.
Even the prospective draftee who did little to game the system stood an excellent
chance of ultimately avoiding any military service. Those who needed more could
alter their lives or records in ways-a sudden passion for divinity school, enlistment
in the Peace Corps, the newly discovered psychiatric disability-that risked no
criminal prosecution and found favor with a draft board. Journalist and Harvard
graduate James Fallows, who perceptively noted the class bias of the Vietnam War
draft, recalls his ticket out was to starve himself below the accepted weight-for-height
limit.39 I recall a college roommate who successfully went in the other direction,
eating himself over the magic maximum weight limit on a diet high in starch and dairy
products.
A law school classmate of mine captured the sentiment of 1968: "I can't be
drafted, I've got a job with Ford Motor Company!" And this early representative of
the 'Me Generation' had it exactly right. By the late 1960s elite Americans sensed that
the Vietnam War was a failure and did not involve vital American interests. If
someone had to fight it, it shouldn't be themselves or their children. Most privileged
young men of draft age had a considerable support system-parents, friends, adult
counselors-who endorsed their decision to avoid military service.
Would a more egalitarian draft or a greater civic sense of obligation on the part
of American elites have made a difference? In the ultimate outcome of the Vietnam
conflict, it most probably would not have. The fault in Vietnam was not primarily
poor American soldiers in the rice paddies or the air-conditioned support offices. The
failures went right to the top of the civilian and military leadership. Yet, in small and
not so small ways, the quality of the force was important. Suppose, to borrow Stephen
Ambrose's phrase: "America chose to throw its finest young men against the Viet
Cong and North Vietnamese" through a draft that operated on the philosophy that there
was no more important place for a talented young American to be than in Vietnam
helping to win the war, or, at least, to avoid defeat. Professor William Eckhardt, a
prosecutor in the My Lai war crimes trials captured the point perfectly at a
retrospective conference on My Lai. He observed: "If the small unit commander at My
Lai the day of the massacre had been William Jefferson Clinton instead of the misfit
Lieutenant William Calley, we wouldn't be here today." A contemporary observer
might speculate on the impact of a dozen young Americans in the Military Police




detachment at the Abu Ghraib prison who had been specifically selected for the duty
because of their exposure to Islamic cultures.
A military in Vietnam that was representative of all social classes might also have
forced a faster resolution of America's uncertainties about the war. Were enough
members of the Vietnam era Congresses receiving input from their sons and daughters
serving at the front? Were they getting the "have to be answered" phone calls from
bank presidents, state party chairmen, and newspaper editors recounting the
experiences of their children in Vietnam?
In retrospect, President Nixon may not have needed to end the draft in order to
placate young American elites (the majority of the most vocal anti-war protestors) and
their parents. The actual operation of the draft described above and the declining draft
calls as American forces began to withdraw from Southeast Asia, probably placed few
upper class young American men at risk of forced induction in 1971-72. Nevertheless,
the draft was a powerful symbol for the generation and its termination gave the
president considerable political and diplomatic advantage. By 1973, the draft had few
defenders and what military sociologist Charley Moskos has called "the triumph of
economics over sociology" took place with few objections.
Is a restoration of the draft possible? If so, how should Congress structure 21st
century conscription? An American military in which sacrifice is more widely shared
amongst all classes is theoretically attractive. It might even make for a better armed
force. However, mere egalitarian sentiments are likely to have little political potency.
America is a generation away from the experience of conscription. The prospect that
Congress could order military service of their son or daughter is anathema to many
parents who vote, make campaign contributions, influence public policy, or just
respond to public opinion polls.
What could force a reconsideration of conscription is a situation in which America
lacks the personnel to staff the military it needs. As of the fall of 2005, that is not a
fanciful prospect.' American armed forces are at their smallest levels of the entire
post-World War II period.41 The current active duty armed force-Army, Navy,
Marines, Air Force-is smaller than the Vietnam Era army alone. Recruitment
shortfalls make national news.42 The forces are lowering recruitment standards to try
40. See, e.g., Niall Ferguson, Sinking Globalization, 84 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 64, 73-74 (2005). Ferguson
concisely notes:
The U.S. empire also suffers from a personnel deficit: 500,000 troops is the maximum
number that Washington can deploy overseas, and this number is simply not sufficient to win
all the small wars the United States currently has (or might have) to wage. Of the 137,000
American troops currently in Iraq, 43 percent are drawn from the reserves or the National
Guard. Even just to maintain the U.S. presence in Iraq, the Army is extending tours of duty
and retaining personnel due to be discharged.
Id.
41. See Department of Defense, Military Personnel Statistics,
http://www.dior.whs.mil/mmid/military/miltop.htm (last visited Oct. 14,2005). DOD Active Duty Military
Personnel Strength Levels reports an army of 1,596,419 in 1952 (the height of the Korean Conflict) and
1,570,343 in 1968 (the height of Vietnam). The army of 2002 numbered 486,542. The total strength of the
Army, Navy, Marines, and Air Force as of August 31, 2005 was 1,429,760.
42. See, e.g., Eric Schmitt, For First Time in Months, Army Meets Its Recruiting Goal, N.Y. TIMES, June
30, 2005, at A22; Army Appears Headed to Recruiting Shortfall, THE NEw MEXICAN, June 9, 2005, at A6;
Damien Cave, For Army Recruiters, a Day of Rules, and Little Else, N.Y. TIMES, May 21, 2005, at A8;
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to keep pace. As troubled as active duty recruitment has been, things are even worse
for the reserves and National Guard. The current situation is the reverse of the
Vietnam experience, in which the Guard and reserves were the hiding places from
unwanted Vietnam service. Today, the total force concept has made Guard and reserve
personnel subject to repeated overseas call-ups. Guard and reserve personnel
understandably feel they get the worst of military service while doing harm to their
civilian careers and family obligations.43
The world remains a seriously dangerous place in 2005. An amorphous cadre of
terrorists has declared unconditional war on the United States and much of western
civilization. Diplomacy and ordinary law enforcement can handle some aspects of the
problem, but the military remains likely to play a role. The use of force, partially for
the purpose of fighting international terrorism, has placed the United States at risk of
a mid- to long-term commitment of combat forces to Afghanistan and Iraq." Those
commitments have stretched the present American armed force close to the breaking
point.
Does that exhaust the possible range of crises that could demand American
military response? Hardly! President George W. Bush identified Iraq, Iran, and North
Korea as an 'axis of evil,' an allusion to the World War II alliance of Germany, Japan,
and Italy. Even those who believe the presidential rhetoric was unwise and overblown
would concede Iran and North Korea have fundamental differences with the United
States that could lead to war.45 Moreover, Iraq may have been the least militarily
challenging of the three foes. A comparison with World War II would place the
United States in the position of having a difficult time fully subduing Mussolini's Italy.
That leaves the rest of the world. The United States has made a half-century of
promises of Israeli security. Less strong promises allow Taiwan to define its eventual
relationship with the mainland of China. What attitude would the United States take
towards a reassertion of Russian dominance over parts of the former Soviet Union?
Has long-term security finally come to the Balkans? And aside from Israel and Iraq,
what changes of government in the oil-rich Middle East would command an American
response? What other genocides or failed states anywhere would command some
American response? This is neither a small, nor unrealistic, agenda.
Editorial, The Death Spiral of the Volunteer Army, N.Y. TIMES, May 29, 2005, at 4.9; Editorial, The Army
Numbers Game, N.Y. TIMES, June 13,2005, at A16; Damien Cave, Pentagon May Consider Older Recruits,
N.Y. TIMES, July 22, 2005, at A 1.
43. See Eric Schmitt & David S. Cloud, Part-Time Forces on Active Duty Decline Steeply, N.Y. TMEs,
July 11, 2005, at Al.
44. See JEREMY RIFKIN, THE EUROPEAN DREAM 292 (2004) (quoting President Bush's West Point grad-
uation speech of 2003: "America has, and intends to keep, military strengths beyond challenge- thereby,
making the destabilizing arms races of other eras pointless, and limiting rivalries to trade and other pursuits
of peace."); John F. Burns & Eric Schmitt, Generals Offer Sober Outlook on Iraqi War, N.Y. TIMES, May
19, 2005, at Al; Richard A. Oppel, Jr. & Eric Schmitt, Bombing Attacks on Iraqi Forces Kill 38 in North,
N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 2005, at A l (quoting Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld: "Insurgencies tend to go on five,
six, eight, 10, 12 years."); Eric Schmitt, Iraqis Not Ready to Fight Rebels on Own, U.S. Says, N.Y. TIMES,
July 21, 2005, at Al.
45. See David E. Sanger& Thom Shanker, U.S. Warns North Korea Against Nuclear Test, N.Y. TIMES,
May 23, 2005, at A9.
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America's enormous technological advantages give it a unique potential to inflict
military damage worldwide. In some cases, that response may achieve desired
political results. As Afghanistan and Iraq suggest, however, our adversaries have
learned from the mistakes of Saddam Hussein. One does not fight a conventional war
in open terrain against the world's foremost nuclear and military power. The
alternatives to traditional warfare can be immensely demanding of American person-
nel. Further, those personnel will need to be very good because their failings have
consequences. Any young officer or enlisted person armed on the streets of Baghdad
or working in the Abu Ghraib prison has the ability to make international news with
a momentary lapse of judgment.'
All of this should invite the American people to take a hard look at the military
and the purposes we want it to serve. If a return to conscription is unacceptable under
any circumstances, we may need to recognize that we will not have 'all the force we
need.' Our ability to influence crucial world events may need to be limited to diplo-
matic and economic responses or may demand the involvement of genuine inter-
national coalitions. That may be a very healthy thing.
If the decision is to return to the draft, Congress and the American people need to
carefully review the prior draft experiences-both successful and unsuccessful. A
crucial message from the past is that fairness is essential.47 Both constitutional law and
sound public policy in 2006 may demand that both sexes be conscripted. Exemptions
-whether on account of health, occupation, education-should be kept to a minimum.
Young people should be subject to induction only when they reach their 18th or 19th
year. If they are selected through a random drawing of numbers or birthdates, they
should serve their obligation prior to college or the start of their occupational career.
A carefully designed conscientious objector program might allow some draftees to
substitute civilian services which pose some of the burdens of military service.
Exemptions to military service, however, should not turn into a broad youth service
program. The object of the draft is to secure personnel for the military. Lastly, those
who serve should be guaranteed the modem equivalent of the post-World War II GI
Bill. These young Americans will have earned full payment of college or vocational
school costs and other readjustment benefits.
VI.
The American people continue to demand civilian control of the military even if
we are not sure what that means. In the modem era, the most visible challenge to the
precept of civilian control was General Douglas MacArthur's bold attempts to override
President Truman's direction of the Korean War. While the momentary public
response of 1951 favored MacArthur with his "no substitute for victory" philosophy,
46. See generally MARK DANNER, TORTURE AND TRUTH, AMERICA, ABU GHRAIB, AND THE WAR ON
TERROR (2004) (reprinting the Article 15-6 Investigation of the 800th Military Police Brigade and the
Article 15-6 Investigation of the Abu Ghraib Prison and the 205th Military Intelligence Brigade).
47. See Charles Moskos, Our Will to Fight Depends on Who is Willing to Die, WALL STREET JOURNAL,
March 20, 2002, at A22. Professor Moskos outlines his thesis: "Only when the privileged classes perform
military service does the country define the cause as worth young people's blood. Only when elite youth
are on the firing line do war losses become more acceptable." Id.
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history has sided solidly with President Truman. He was right both on the constitu-
tional issue and on the proper direction of the Korean Conflict.
No high commander since MacArthur has attempted such a public challenge of
his commander-in-chief. In practice, generals and admirals have become more skilled
politicians. A study of the Clinton Administration reflects a militarily inexperienced
president regularly being outflanked on military and political issues-e.g., gays and
lesbians in the armed forces, Balkan policy-by such savvy insiders as General Colin
Powell. If the military's wishes do not have the support of the commander-in-chief,
there is always Congress, the media, and the American public to help support the
military's case.
A review of military-civilian relations since the Truman-MacArthur controversy
would suggest that the civilians have been less respectful of their role than has the
military. Healthy civil-military relations require the military to recognize that political
considerations may outweigh military ones and that the ultimate decisions lie with the
civilian leadership. Healthy civil-military relations, however, also encourages the
civilian leadership to respect the expertise of the professional military. Civilian micro-
management (e.g., Lyndon Johnson approving individual bombing raids in Vietnam)
does harm to that objective. Civilian overriding of the military on major military
decisions is a closer question. The size of the force needed for the Iraqi invasion in
2003 raised the issue most sharply. Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld heard, but rejected,
Army Chief of Staff General Eric Shinseki's warning that sufficient American forces
were not in place to both displace Saddan Hussein and to win the peace. Clearly, the
decision as to what post-war consequences follow a successful regime displacement
involve both military and political/diplomatic considerations. The Constitution gives
the ultimate decision to the civilian establishment. As of the fall of 2005, however,
General Shinseki appears the more foresighted on the issue.
VII.
Some final considerations involve the political neutrality of the military. The
Supreme Court in Greer v. Spock endorsed the concept a quarter-century ago.4" The
Spock decision suggests we mix the military and partisan politics at considerable risk
to the country and the military. As with civilian control issues, obligations for
preserving the military's partisan neutrality fall on both the military and the civilian
leadership. Military leaders, and the collective institution of the military, should avoid
being drawn into partisan politics. As noted, the military model is General George
Marshall--during his time in uniform he was the political neutral. The civilian
leadership also has a responsibility to keep the military out of partisan politics and
avoid using the military to score partisan points. For the most part, the leaders of
1940-1970 followed these precepts. The last three decades have considerably eroded
them.
One aspect of the change is the position of the major political parties on military
issues. A comparison of the 1960 and 2004 Presidential elections is revealing. In
1960, Democrat John Kennedy upset Republican Vice President Richard Nixon, the
48. Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 848 (1976) (holding that the military may prohibit partisan campaign
activities on military installations).
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logical successor to the highly popular military hero Dwight Eisenhower. Part of
Kennedy's successful campaign contrasted his PT-109 combat experience with Vice
President Nixon's less heroic service as a desk-bound staff officer. More importantly,
Kennedy challenged President Eisenhower's defense policy-namely, the presence of
a Soviet advantage in long-range missiles-and made his case to the American people.
President Kennedy then reaffirmed Democratic Party defense credentials with his
widely praised inaugural address that promised to "pay any [military] price" to fight
Communist aggression.49
In 2004, the Democrats again offered an attractive war hero who could trump
President Bush's less attractive record of military service. The complications of the
Iraq War provided the basis for a strong challenge of the administration's defense
policy. Yet, the Democrats could not sell their case to the American people. Many
things make 1960 different from 2004, but a core difference is that over those forty-
four years the Democrats have lost credibility as a party to entrust with responsibilities
for national defense. The party of Woodrow Wilson, Franklin Roosevelt, Harry
Truman, and John Kennedy has become the party of George McGovern, Jimmy Carter,
Michael Dukakis, and John Kerry. Capable military credentials of its candidates-
World War II bomber pilot McGovern, Naval Academy graduate and nuclear
submarine officer Carter, Korean era draftee Dukakis, and decorated Vietnam combat
veteran Kerry--could not reverse the popular perception that the Democratic Party was
ambivalent about financial support for the military, did not understand the military
culture, and was actively hostile to some aspects of a robust national defense program.
Of equal importance, these views were shared by a considerable portion of the
career military.5" The euphoric responses from officers clubs and in NCO clubs to
Ronald Reagan's victory over Jimmy Carter in 1980 and the opposition to Bill
Clinton's effort to integrate gays and lesbians into the forces in 1993 were symbols of
a larger alienation.5 Democratic opportunities to put solidly pro-military candidates
at the head of the ticket were rejected either by party insiders or primary voters.
Senator John Glenn, the epitome of the 'right stuff' could not secure the party
nomination for president. Senators Henry Jackson and Sam Nunn, solid defense
strategists, saw presidential trial balloons go nowhere. In 2004, General Wesley Clark
found that a solid military resume left one struggling for 4th and 5th place finishes in
Democratic primaries. Even the Kerry experiment turned out badly. His actual war
record was blurred by the Swift Boat Veterans' challenges to his opposition to the war.
Kerry's uncertainties and reversals on the Iraq War came across to the American voters
as indecisive.
49. Transcript of Inaugural Address of President John F. Kennedy, available at
http://www.ourdocuments.gov/doc.php?flash=false&doc=91&page=transcript (last visited Oct. 31, 2005).
50. A related concern is reflected in documented reports that officers and faculty at the Air Force
Academy had become advocates for their own conservative Christian beliefs in their dealings with cadets.
See Laurie Goodstein & Will Shanley, Air Force Academy Staff Found Promoting Religion, N.Y. TMES,
June 23, 2005, at A12; T.R. Reid, Air Force Chaplain Removed From Post, PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, May
15, 2005, at A4.
51. Historian David Hackett Fischer is blunt on the Clinton record: "[Clinton] had no knowledge of
military problems, alienated the armed services, failed miserably as a military leader in Somalia, and was
one of the least successful commanders-in-chief in American history." DAVID HACKETr FISCHER, LIBERTY
AND FREEDOM 701 (2005).
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Partisan politics also seem to be infecting the senior ranks of the armed services
in ways that I suspect General Marshall would have deplored. Both Republican and
Democrat conventions in 2004 were eager to parade numbers of recently retired senior
officers praising their party's cause and candidates. While such conduct would violate
regulations for an active duty officer, the fact that a well-known military name has just
recently retired may be lost on the American convention viewer and voter. It would
also be a leap of faith to assume that the general or admiral had only acquired partisan
political views in the few months since retirement.
A new definition of the 'political general' characterizes the era. Previously, the'political general' was the influential civilian politician suddenly raised to high mili-
tary rank and command. Now he or she is the career military figure who jumps to
partisan politics. There is nothing new in American history about the career soldier
becoming a major political figure. Grant, Eisenhower, and Marshall head a distin-
guished list. However, all three turned to partisan politics after they had completed
their military careers with enormous distinction and with no perception that they had
played partisan politics to reach the highest ranks. Part of the attraction to voters and
presidents was precisely their non-political, servant-of-the-American-people posture.
The modem political generals or admirals-Alexander Haig, Colin Powell, and
Stansfield Turner are major examples-have followed a different pattern. Their
military skills, including combat heroism, have brought them to the attention of
Washington political figures in the middle of their careers. These are upwardly mobile
colonels and one star officers, not supreme commanders and chiefs of staff, when their
careers begin to mix the military and partisan politics. When their contemporaries, and
competitors for higher rank, help run Camp Swampy or a Pentagon office, they are
mixing with presidents, secretaries of defense, and congressional leaders. The role is
a delicate one and subject to the reality and perception that the military officer has
become part of the president's political team. Within the military, the perception may
be that the position offers the 'big break' to move to the highest levels of military
leadership.
One danger of the contemporary 'political general', whether still on active duty
or retired, is the loss of a skilled non-partisan servant of the nation. Recent American
history is full of examples of retired military officers moving to civilian leadership
positions in the public sector. The officers often bring an expertise and leadership
ability that make them unique. Much of their credibility in their new position comes
from the reality and perception that they don't bring a partisan political agenda with
them. They are servants of the American people, not adjuncts of the Republican or
Democratic Party. Few others in national and international affairs can bring that back-
ground. To trade that non-partisanship for an appearance on stage at a national con-
vention or a pro or anti-administration op-ed in a national newspaper is a loss for
America.
Finally, the military needs to be careful about placing all its eggs in one political
basket. Democrats may feel they cannot win back the military community and should
not try. Their political future is in a different vision of America, one that is respectful
of military personnel, but also envisions solving international public policy matters in
ways different than the use of military force. Under this vision, new weapons systems,
expanded force structures, and larger Pentagon bureaucracies will yield to other
priorities. If the Republicans have become undeniably the military party, they may
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feel little need to specially cultivate military voters or the military command.
Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld's bold efforts to restructure the military52 doubtless
have been helped by the reality that the military has little political clout to upset major
changes that come from the Republican party.
VIII.
These are uneasy times. The nation and the military face a wide range of serious
challenges. Servicemen and women are highly regarded in the abstract. But their lives
are remote from significant portions of the population.53 Within a decade we may
expect it will only be the rare senator or representative who knows the military from
firsthand experience. A troubling 'quasi-wartime' has placed all the sacrifice on the
members of the military. Civilians in prior wars have seen their taxes rise, their access
to essential and inessential goods and services cut, and their persons ordered to
military service. American civilians since September 11, 2001 have been encouraged
to shop and have had their taxes cut. More Americans today can identify the hosts of
reality shows and top professional draft choices than can identify the members of the
joint chiefs of staff or the field commanders in Iraq and Afghanistan.
The American people and their leaders need to take a hard look at what they need
from their military. They also need to assess whether the civilian community can
command wars without civilian sacrifice. The questions challenge some fundamental
assumptions of the last three decades. But, the times demand realistic answers.
52. Thorn Shanker & Eric Schmitt, Pentagon Weighs Strategy Change to Deter Terror, N.Y. TIMES,
July 5, 2005, at Al; see generally Department of Defense, 2004 Secretary of Defense Annual Report to the
President and Congress (2004), available at http://www.defenselink.mil/execsec/adr2004/
adr2004_toc.html.
53. The closing of military bases over the last two decades has also removed many communities from
daily connection with the military and military personnel. In the latest round of proposed closings, thirty-
three major bases are on the hit list. See Eric Schmitt, Military Base Closings: The Overview; Pentagon
Seeks to Shut Dozens of Bases Across Nation, N.Y. TIMES, May 23, 2005, at Al.
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